S ocial science has long been concerned with the way individuals organize themselves and how they influence or help bring about a certain social structure. Networks are an important component to economic life, both in a developed economic setting or a reforming and developing economy. An understanding of how networks operate in a specific politicoeconomic environment is telling of how certain bonds of affiliation, that are often informal in nature and character, act as "lubricants for getting things done" and of how order and meaning in social life is maintained.
clubs, political parties, alumni groups, social clubs, and so forth. 2 The guiding notion behind the application of a network approach to economic reform is to understand why and how certain kinds of networks are more effective in capturing resources than others under certain reform conditions. Social network literature makes that point quite clearly by studying actors in interaction with one another and how those interactions constitute a framework or structure that can be studied and analyzed. 3 The arguments that are put forward in this essay are based on participant observation research conducted among members of the business elite of Egypt in the 1990s. The interviews cited here are drawn from field research that was carried out for more than three years as part of a doctoral thesis on state-business relations in Egypt in the 1990s.
This essay examines the process of economic reform since the early 1990s and shows how that process created opportunities for particular actors located both inside and outside the state. Specifically, I examine the impact of reforms on three groups of actors: (1) state officials involved in the implementation of reform policies; (2) former bureaucrats who were recent entrants into the private sector; and (3) the established business elite. My argument, at the most general level, is that reforms created the possibility for the creation of new networks that linked state officials and former bureaucrats, and permitted them to capture the benefits of privatization, often at the expense of more established business actors.
Offering a different perspective than that by Ulrich Wurzel (chapter 3), this essay argues that Egypt's reform process, and particularly the privatization experience since the 1990s, offers insights not only into the dynamics of existing, pre-reform economic networks, but about the role of policy reform in network creation. Economic policy reforms in the 1990s provided space for new networks to emerge in an institutional and social environment that had long sustained privileged ties between business and state. In this sense, state-business relations in this period operated on two distinct but interconnected levels. On one hand, businessmen acted to preserve the collective good represented by an environment of crony capitalism that favored the presence of privileged economic networks. On the other, they competed, often aggressively, to insert their particular networks into channels of rent seeking that were being altered by policy reforms. This sometimes entailed the reshaping of networks to incorporate actors best positioned to compete effectively for rents created by the reregulation of the Egyptian economy. The interplay of these two levels of action, the complementarities and tensions that they exhibited, offer a useful framework for understanding the broader politics of economic reform in Egypt.
